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INTRODUCTION 
This Pol it ion seeks t* review a decision ot the Court of 
Appeals disregarding the plain language of sections 1101 and 1102 of 
the Uniform Probate Code, the uniform state of authority adhering to 
the Rule that settlement agreements of all types which by law are 
subject to court approval must be approved before the settlements are 
binding on the parties and dismissing the view of this Court on the 
precise issue in question as "dictum* The court below, sweeping 
aside legislative direction and uniform authority to the contrary, 
held that a family settlement agreement materially altering a 
spendthrift trust was butdinij mron I I iiinjii il had been categorically 
repudiated over five years before Respondents even attempted to 
secure the court approval required by the Uniform Probate Code. 
This Petition further seeks I review thr I'ouit of Appeals' 
denial of Petitioners' constitutional right to trial by jury on the 
issues of duress and failure of consideration which Petitioners 
presented lor t i i a 1 a claims In sit aaidt I lit* f tnu I ^  settlement 
agreement and as affirmative defenses to Respondents' counterclaim 
for $10,000,000 in damages for breach of contract in flat disregard 
of this Cm i r t ' * idopf i mi t il II n I ciioi a 1 i u 11 on II HJ r i qht to jury 
trial in International Harvester Credit Corp, v. Pioneer Tractor & 
Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981). 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Whether under the Uniform Probate Code a family 
settlement agreement materially altering and terminating the 
inalienable interest cieated under a spendthrift trust is, prior to 
court approval, binding and enforceable or subject to repudiation by 
the trustee and beneficiaries of the f rust. 
2. When the same issues as to the validity of a contract, 
duress and failure of consideration, are presented both as equitable 
claims for rescission and as affirmative defenses to a counterclaim 
for $10,000,000 for breach of the contract, are petitioners entitled 
to trial by jury on those issues under this Court's decision in 
International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor & Implement, 
Inc., 626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981). 
OPINIONS BELOW 
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals has been reported in 
Grimm, et al. v. Roberts, et al., 125 Utah Adv. Rep. 37 (Ut. Ct. App. 
1989) and is set forth verbatim in the appendix to this Petition. 
(A-l) . The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
entered by the district court have not been reported but are set forth 
verbatim in the appendix to this Petition. (A-2, A-3, respectively). 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of the Court 
of Appeals by writ of certiorari under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(a) 
and (5), and Rules 42 and 43(2), (3) and (4), Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court. The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals was entered on 
December 29, 1989.- On January 5, 1990, this Court granted 
Petitioners an extension of time to February 28, 1990 to file this 
Petition. (Order, dated January 5, 1990). 
GOVERNING PROVISIONS 
The sections of the Uniform Probate Code requiring court appro-
val of a family settlement agreement are Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-3-1101 
1* The Court of Appeals originally entered its Opinion on 
December 20, 19 89, but then entered an Amended Opinion on 
December 29, 1989. 
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and 75-3-1102, The Court of Appeals, in holding court approval of the 
family settlement agreement was not required, relied on section 912 of 
the Uniform Probate Code. The right to trial by jury in civil cases 
is governed by Article I, § 10 of the Utah Constitution. Those 
statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth verbatim in the 
appendix to this Petition. (A-4, A-5, A-6, A-7, respectively). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This Petition arises out of a consolidated action relating to 
the estate of Edward Miller Grimm. Plaintiffs in the consolidated 
action were Mr. Grimm's wife, Maxine Grimm, their two children, Pete 
and Linda Grimm, and E. LaVar Tate, Mrs. Grimm's brother and hsr 
co-executor of what is referred to as Mr. Grimm's non-Philippine will 
("Petitioners"). Defendants were two children of Mr. Grimm's first 
marriage, Juanita Morris and Ethel Roberts, Mr. Grimm's first wife, 
Juanita Grimm, and Rex Roberts, the second husband of Ethel Roberts 
("Respondents-). The fundamental issue in the consolidated action was 
the validity of a family settlement agreement that materially altered 
Mr. Grimm's estate plan, including a spendthrift trust he set up to 
provide for the maintenance and support of his wife Maxine to whom he 
had been married for over 30 years ("FSA"). The FSA was entered into 
on April 25, 1978, less than six months after Mr. Grimm's death, by 
(1) Mr. Grimm's widow Maxine and their two children, Pete and Linda, 
and (2) Mr. Grimm's first wife, Juanita Grimm, and her two children, 
Ethel Roberts and Juanita Morris. 
The first of the consolidated actions was initiated on May 16, 
1980 in the Third District Court of Tooele County by Ethel Roberts and 
Juanita Morris filing a probate petition to remove Maxine Grimm and 
LaVar Tate as the personal representatives of Mr. Grimm's estate. 
Defendants' petition did not seek or request in any way that the court 
approve the FSA or that Mr. Grimm's estate be distributed in 
2/ 
accordance with the FSA. (PR. 84-81).— 
Maxine and LaVar filed an answer and counterclaim in the 
probate proceeding on September 10, 1980 and simultaneously they and 
Maxine's two children, Pete and Linda, (Petitioners) commenced a civil 
action against Juanita Grimm, Juanita Morris, Ethel and Rex Roberts 
(Respondents). The counterclaim and complaint essentially stated 
parallel claims for relief and, in addition, the complaint stated a 
claim on behalf of Maxine for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. (PR. 236-152; CR. 101-1). A number of the separate claims 
in Petitioners' pleadings attacked the validity of the FSA on numerous 
grounds, including that the FSA was of no further force and effect 
because it had been repudiated before it was ever submitted for court 
approval as required under sections 75-3-1101 and 1102 of the Uniform 
Probate Code, that the FSA was void from.its inception because it 
materially altered and terminated a spendthrift trust, and that the 
FSA was invalid by reason of duress and failure of consideration, 
(id.). The civil action and probate proceeding were consolidated on 
January 20, 1981. 
Respondents never sought court approval of the FSA until many 
years after Petitioners categorically repudiated the FSA. Respondents 
never in any way sought court approval of the FSA until they obtained 
2. The Tooele County Clerk's office continued to maintain 
separate files in the probate and civil actions after consolidation 
and has paginated and indexed those two separate records pursuant to 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Citations to the 
record will refer to "PR." for original papers filed, indexed and 
paginated by the Clerk's office in the probate action and "CR." for 
the civil action. 
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leave to file an amended answer and counterclaim on February 13, 1985, 
more than four years after they initiated their probate petition and 
more than five years after Petitioners had clearly and unequivocally 
repudiated the FSA.-7 (CR. 362, 373-72; PR. 1638-28)- Respondents' 
counterclaim also asserted a $10,000,00*0 breach of contract claim 
against Petitioners. (PR. 1633-32) Petitioners again set up duress 
and failure of consideration as affirmative defenses in reply to the 
breach of contract claim. (CR. 948-41). 
Petitioners timely demanded trial by jury on all issues of law, 
including duress and failure of consideration. (CR. 873-71; July 26, 
30, 1985 TR. at 22). Respondents objected and, after briefing and 
argument, the district court issued the following bench ruling: 
I never questioned the right to your trial by jury for legal 
issues. There's no problem with that . . . We can impanel a 
jury, but the court will still make the ultimate decision as 
to whether the contracts are valid or invalid. Then the jury 
can decide on the legal issues. 
The court will make the decision and have the jury sit through 
the whole case, hear the issues with regard to duress, 
coercion as to how they apply, if we get beyond the 
determination of whether or not the contracts are valid. That 
is the first issue. . . . (July 26, 30, 1985 TR. at 19). 
Therefore, I grant you the benefit of having a jury trial, 
but so that everybody understands, the court will make the 
decision as to whether or not the family settlement agreement 
is valid or invalid, and then based upon that you may proceed 
on your counterclaim — you may not proceed, but at that time 
the plaintiffs here cannot say that they didn't have the right 
for the jury to hear all of the defenses with regard to 
coercion, duress and other defenses. . . . (Id. at 23) 
(emphasis added). 
3. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Respondents 
sought court approval in 1983, it is uncontroverted that Respondents 
did not obtain leave to file their amended answer and counterclaim, 
which is the first pleading in which they sought court approval, 
until February 13, 1985. (CR. 362, 373-372). In any event, even if 
Respondents sought court approval in 1983, it is clear the FSA had 
been repudiated years before court approval was ever sought. 
Trial commenced on August 6, 1985 before a jury. (TRA. 3).— 
After nine days of trial, the district court, without giving any 
reasons, ruled in favor of Respondents and against Petitioners, and 
dismissed the jury. (TRB. 1125). 
Eight months later, the district court entered its findings of 
fact and conclusions of law and judgment, (CR. 1258-31)- The judgment 
simply approved the FSA pursuant to sections 75-3-1101 and 75-3-1102 of 
the Uniform Probate Code and summarily denied all other claims for 
relief. (CR. 1258-55). The court decided all issues with regard to 
duress and failure of consideration. (CR. 1253, 1240, 1235-34). 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held with regard to the 
questions presented in this Petition: (1) That court approval of the 
FSA was not required under sections 1101 and 1102 of the Uniform 
Probate Code and that the FSA was not subject to repudiation in the 
absence of fraud, duress and failure of consideration; and (2) That 
Petitioners were not entitled to trial by jury on the issues of duress 
and failure of consideration on the ground those issues went to the 
-validity" of the FSA and were "clearly equitable". (A-l). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Edward Miller Grimm died on November 27, 1977 in Manila, 
Republic of the Philippines. (TRA. 9). Mr. Grimm was an American 
citizen and maintained residences both in the Philippines and Tooele, 
Utah. (TRA. 9; CR. 1252). 
4. The transcript of the trial was transcribed by two different 
reporters* The first reporter transcribed the first 3 volumes of 
the transcript and paginated the transcript from page 1 in Volume I 
to page 527 in Volume III. The second reporter transcribed the 
remaining 6 volumes of the transcript and paginated those volumes 
from page 1 in Volume IV to page 1127 in Volume IX. The first 3 
volumes of the transcript are referred to as "TRA." and the last 6 
volumes of the transcript as "TRB." 
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Mr. Grimm was survived by his wife of 30 years, Maxine Grimm, 
and their two children Linda and Pete Grimm and by two children of a 
prior marriage, Ethel Roberts and Juanita Morris ("Nita"). 
At the time of his death, Mr. Grimm left an estate worth over 
$8,000,000. (DX-272). He disposed of his estate under an inter vivos 
spendthrift trust and two wills, one which disposed of all his 
property located in the Philippines and one which disposed of all his 
property situated outside the Philippines. (PX-6, 7, 11). The trust 
categorically precluded transfer or hypothecation of any beneficiary's 
interest in the income or principal of the trust. (PX-11 at 9). 
There is no question Mr. Grimm's trust was a valid spendthrift 
trust. Neither the trial court or the Court of Appeals made any 
findings or determinations to the contrary. (CR. 1254-31; A-l). 
Indeed, the uncontroverted evidence established the spendthrift trust 
was valid. Mr. Grimm executed the written trust on July 12, 1977. 
(PX-11). On the same day, he executed and delivered a written 
assignment of his stock in Globe Investment Company to the trustee of 
the spendthrift trust. (PX-11; TRB. 440-42). Globe Investment 
Company reissued Mr. Grimm's stock in the name of the trustee, the 
reissued stock was delivered to the trustee and the stock transfer was 
reflected in the stock ledger of Globe. (PX-12, 13). The Globe stock, 
was a substantial asset worth approximately $2,000,000 when Mr. Grimm 
died in November of 1977. (DX-272). In addition to the initial 
transfer of Globe stock, Mr. Grimm made numerous other written, 
verified assignments of assets to the trust when he and his son 
returned to the Philippines in August of 1977. (PX-14-55; TRB. 444, 
449-50). There is no question those assignments were executed and 
delivered to the trustee. (TRB. 448-50). It is uncontroverted Mr. 
Grimm was competent when he executed the trust and executed and 
delivered the written assignments of his assets to the trustee. (TRA. 
44, 480-82; TRB. 442-43, 448-49). 
Under Mr. Grimm's estate plan, 88.6% of Mr. Grimm's entire 
estate was dedicated to his wife Maxine's maintenance and support. 
(PX-169E). Mr. Grimm gave 50% of the trust assets to Maxine and 50% 
to Pete and Linda, with Pete and Linda's share being available for 
Maxine's support and maintenance. (PX-169D, 169J). Mr. Grimm also 
gave Pete and Linda 50% of his estate under the non-Philippine will 
and 23% under the Philippine will. (PX-169J). Mr. Grimm only left 
Ethel and Nita 3.7% of his total assets under the trust and two wills 
pursuant to the Philippine will. (PX-169H). In dollars, Ethel and 
Nita were each to receive $96,423 under Mr. Grimm's estate plan, while 
$4,623,657 was dedicated to the support of his widow Maxine. 
(PX-169B). $3,674,876 of that amount was protected by the spendthrift 
clause of the trust. (PX-169). 
On April 25, 1978, less than six months after Mr. Grimm's 
death, Maxine, Pete and Linda Grimm entered into the FSA with Ethel 
and Nita and their mother, Juanita Grimm. (PX-58, 59). It is uncon-
troverted the FSA materially altered Mr. Grimm's estate plan and, in 
particular, altered and terminated the spendthrift trust* The FSA 
explicitly made the trust and its assets subject to the FSA. (PX-59 
at 1). The FSA gave Ethel and Nita 25% of the net estate instead of 
3.7% which their father chose to give them, increasing their share 
from $192,846 to $1,277,038 and giving them substantially more than 
Pete and Linda. (PX-58 at 8; PX-59, 169B, 169C; TRB. 65-66, 
654-55). Maxine was required to pay Nita and Ethel whatever amount 
was necessary "so that each of them will receive an amount equal to 
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twelve and one-half percent (12 1/2%) of the total of the net 
distributable estate and marital share." (PX-58 at 8; PX-59; TRB. 
65-66, 654-55). As a consequence, assets Mr. Grimm had placed in 
trust for the care and maintenance of Maxine were transferred and 
redistributed to Ethel and Nita under the FSA. (PX-58 at 8; PX-59 at 
1). There is simply no other source for the additional $1,000,000 
that Ethel and Nita picked up under the FSA. (Compare PX-169C with 
169B). But the FSA did not merely require property placed in the 
spendthrift trust by Mr. Grimm to be transferred to Ethel and Nita. 
The FSA displaced the trust and, contrary to Mr. Grimm's desires, his 
property was distributed not in trust, not with the protection of the 
spendthrift clause for his beneficiaries, but directly to the parties 
to the FSA, including Maxine, Pete and Linda. (PX-58, 59). 
Maxine, Linda and Pete unequivocally repudiated the FSA five 
years before it was ever submitted to the court for approval. (TRA. 
208-11, 443-46, 468-69; TRB. 424-25, 504-05; DX-283; PX-173). They 
repudiated the FSA orally, in writing and by filing the civil action, 
(id.). Both lower courts acknowledged that the FSA was repudiated 
long before it was ever submitted to the court for approval. (CR. 
1236; A-l at 6, 11-12). 
There was ample evidence, as the Court of Appeals acknowledged, 
from which a jury could have determined that the FSA was the product 
of duress and without adequate consideration. (A-l at 15). After Mr. 
Grimm's death, Ethel and Rex undertook a calculated campaign to 
illegally gain control of Mr. Grimm's estate and to intimidate Maxine 
into signing a settlement giving Ethel and Nita significantly more 
than their father had chosen to give them under his estate plan. 
That calculated campaign included outrageous conduct on the 
part of the Roberts. While Maxine was in Tooele, Utah burying her 
husband, Ethel illegally secured her appointment as special admini-
stratrix to gain control of Mr. Grimm's estate in the Philippines by 
filing a perjurious verified petition alleging her father had died 
intestate and Maxine was not a resident of the Philippines. (TRA. 
75-80, 501-09, 523-24; TRB. 15; PX-73, 77, 79, 81). Both allegations 
were false and Ethel knew they were false. (Id.)- While Maxine was 
still in the United States, the Roberts broke into Maxine's home in 
the Philippines and took valuable contents of safes and Maxine's per-
sonal papers, including her credit cards and check book. (PX-82, 85; 
TRA. 113-115; TRB. 20-24, 636-37). When Maxine demanded Ethel relin-
quish her illegal appointment and return Maxine"s property, (PX-88), 
Ethel and her husband refused, telling Maxine they would not do so 
until Maxine signed the FSA. (TRA. 118; TRB. 11-12, 639-41; DX-214) . 
Ethel and her husband attempted to achieve their demand for more 
by repeatedly threatening to claim Mr. Grimm's first divorce was 
illegal and Maxine's marriage invalid, to go to the authorities and 
expose Mr. Grimm's tax problems, and to work against Maxine so as to 
jeopardize the estate's 50% interest in Mr. Grimm's major businesses. 
(TRA 122-23; TRB. 466-72, 236-37; PX-95). 
Ethel and Nita, however, did not have a bona fide claim to 
participate in their father's estate beyond his wishes. Mr. Grimm's 
divorce was valid. Their mother had been divorced from Mr. Grimm for 
over 30 years in a contested divorce proceeding in which she appeared 
and was represented by counsel. (PX-1, 2, 3). No good faith argument 
could be made that her divorce from Mr. Grimm was subject to collateral 
attack. (DX-250, 252; TRB. 310, 909-10). Mr. Grimm's wills and trust 
were valid and Respondents themselves admitted his competency. (PX-6, 
7, 11; TRA. 480, 482), Respondents simply did not have a claim for more. 
Indeed, at trial the Roberts and their lawyer unequivocally 
testified that prior to the execution of the FSA they made no bona fide 
claim against Mr. Grimm's estate. (TRB. 52, 55, 651-52, 898-901). The 
Roberts' claims amounted to nothing more than bullying and blackmail. 
The Court of Appeals' finding that the parties' lawyers had 
prolonged and extensive involvement in the negotiations leading up to 
the FSA simply is not true. The lawyers the parties retained did not 
negotiate the basic deal reflected in the FSA and only played a 
peripherial role in the settlement negotiations. (TRB. 236, 240-42, 
245-46, 642, 654-55, 915; PX-174). The basic deal — the division of 
Mr, Grimm's estate reflected in the FSA — was reached in a series of 
approximately 30 meetings and conversations between Ethel, Rex, Maxine 
and Pete in the Philippines in late February and March of 1978 after 
Maxine returned from Mr. Grimm's funeral in Tooele. (Id.). Ethel's 
conduct continued to be outrageous during that time. She swore and 
screamed at Maxine. She and Rex would simply show up at Maxine's home 
unannounced, walk in and start demanding a greater interest in Mr. 
Grimm's estate* (TRA. 122-23, 125-27; TRB. 472). Maxine finally could 
not take anymore and agreed to the FSA. (TRA. 161-62; PX-9 5). 
REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT 
A. The Court of Appeals Totally Disregarded The Plain Language Of 
The Uniform Probate Code And This Court's Decision In Chasel. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's judgment uphol-
ding the FSA but did so on different grounds than the grounds relied 
on by the trial court. The trial court upheld the FSA by approving it 
pursuant to sections 1101 and 1102. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
trial court on the grounds court approval under sections 1101 and 1102 
was not required and the FSA was not subject to repudiation in the 
absence of fraud, duress and failure of consideration. Its theory was 
that family settlement agreements are made binding under two separate 
statutory provisions of the Uniform Probate Code — section 912 and 
sections 1101-1102. According to the Court of Appeals, section 912 
provides for family settlement agreements to be binding on the parties 
to the agreement without court approval, leaving the court approval 
requirements of sections 1101 and 1102 applicable only to nonparties, 
such as minors and unborn heirs. (A-l at 6-9). 
Certiorari in this case is necessary to resolve the scope and 
applicability of the compromise-court approval provisions of the 
Uniform Probate Code. By holding the FSA was binding and valid regard-
less of court approval, the Court of Appeals emasculated the court 
approval mechanism of sections 1101 and 1102, defied the clear legisla-
tive direction encased in the plain language of those provisions, and 
disregarded this Court's direction on the precise question presented. 
Sections 1101 and 1102 are the provisions of the Uniform 
Probate Code that apply to the settlement of claims in a decedent's 
estate. They apply to all settlements not just some settlements. The 
plain language of those sections says they apply to all settlements — 
"A compromise of any controversy . . ." (§ 75-3-1101) — "The 
procedure for securing court approval of a compromise is as follows:" 
(§ 75-3-1102). The legislative history of sections 1101 and 1102 
confirms they apply to all settlements: "This section and the one 
preceding it [§ 1101] outline a procedure which may be initiated . . . 
as a means of resolving controversy concerning the estate." Editorial 
Board Comment § 75-3-1101, 1102 (emphasis added). 
In order for the settlement of claims in a decedent's estate to 
be binding, court approval is required. The plain language of section 
1101 says so: "A compromise of any controversy as to . . . the rights 
or interests in the estate of the decedent . . . if approved in a 
formal proceeding in the court for that purpose, is binding on all the 
parties thereto- . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1101 (emphasis added). 
The statute does not say the settlement is binding without court 
approval. It does not say it is binding until the court disapproves 
it. The statute means what it says. Prior to court approval, a 
family settlement agreement is not binding and may be repudiated. 
Court approval, contrary to the Court of Appeals' rationale, is 
necessary to make the FSA binding on parties and nonparties alike. 
That requirement again is reflected in the plain language, approval 
structure and legislative history of sections 1101 and 1102. Section 
1101 explicitly states a settlement Mif approved . . . is binding on 
all of the parties thereto . . ." The approval structure of section 
1102 requires that: "The terms of the compromise shall be set forth 
in an agreement in writing which shall be executed by all competent 
persons . . . w, not just minors, unborn heirs and those with 
inalienable interests. Utah Code Amu §§ 75-3-1101, 1102 (emphasis 
added). The plain language of the statute is reinforced by the 
legislative history of those sections: "If all competent persons with 
beneficial interests or claims which might be affected by the proposal 
• • • concur, a settlement scheme differing from that otherwise 
governing the distribution may be substituted.- Editorial Board 
Comment, § 75-3-1101, 1102 (emphasis added). 
There are sound policy reasons for requiring court approval of 
a family settlement agreement before that settlement is binding on the 
parties and not subject to repudiation. Sections 1101 and 1102 were 
added to the Uniform Probate Code in 19 69 to deal with compromises 
altering the desires and intentions of the testator. The public policy 
behind those provisions, as reflected in their legislative history, is 
to respect the desires of the testator in the absence of the 
concurrence of his intended beneficiaries and approval of the court: 
"The only reason for approving a scheme of devolution which differs 
from that framed by the testator . . . is to prevent dissipation of the 
estate in wasteful litigation. . . . A controversy which the court may 
find to be in good faith, as well as concurrence of all beneficially 
interested and competent persons and parent-representatives provide 
prerequisites which should prevent the procedure from being abused.M 
Editorial Board Comment, §§ 75-3-1101, 1102 (emphasis added). Without 
the prerequisites — concurrence and approval — the testator's wishes 
should control. Indeed, when the intended beneficiaries do not concur, 
there simply is no foundation for court approval of a settlement agree-
ment materially altering the testator's estate plan and the intent of 
the testator should be effectuated. If the intended beneficiaries 
repudiate the family settlement agreement prior to court approval, the 
court should not be permitted to override the testator's desires and 
write a new estate plan for the disposition of his property. 
The plain language of sections 1101 and 1102 is supported by the 
uniform rule in every jurisdiction that has addressed the issue of 
whether a settlement which by law is subject to court approval can be 
repudiated prior to court approval. The uniform rule across the board 
is those settlements may be repudiated at any time prior to court 
approval. That rule is uniformly followed in all types of settlements 
which by law are subject to court approval. It has been applied to 
class action settlements subject to court approval under Rule 23(e), 
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Georqevich v. Strauss, 96 F.R.D. 192, 197 (M.D.Pa. 1982), aff'd in part 
and vacated on other grounds, 772 F.2d 1078 (3d Cir. 1985); to work-
man's compensation settlements, Mackav v. Kerr-McGee, 312 S.E.2d 565 
(S.C. App. 1984); guardian ad litem settlements, DaCanav v. Mendoza, 
573 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1978); and will contest settlements requiring 
probate approval, Vece v. DeBiase, 197 N.E.2d 79 (111. App. 1964), app. 
dismd., 202 N.E.2d 482 (111. 1964). The Rule is so settled that it is 
reflected in Encyclopedias, 15A C.J.S. Compromise 8c Settlement, §§ 2 at 
176 — "Where a party repudiates the compromise agreement before it is 
approved or confirmed by the court . . . the court should not confirm 
the agreement.M 
The Court of Appeals did not even discuss or attempt to 
distinguish this clearly established, uniform line of authority. (See 
A-l) . The Court of Appeals did not cite one case to the contrary. 
(Id,), The Court of Appeals' failure to cite any authority is no 
accident. There is none. 
Moreover, this Court has expressed its view that a family 
settlement agreement is not binding prior to court approval. In In the 
Matter of the Estate of Frank Chasel, 725 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1986), there 
was an attempt to set aside a settlement agreement after court approval 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1101. In holding that a family 
settlement agreement could not be set aside after court approval, this 
Court said: "compromise agreements authorized by Part II of the 
Probate Code must be approved in formal proceedings.H 725 P.2d at 1348 
5/ (emphasis added).- The corollary of this Court's language is that 
5. This Court also made the following statement regarding the issue: 
"Except for the requirement of court approval and other statutory require-
ments in Part II, a compromise agreement under the Probate Code is like 
other compromise agreements." 725 P. 2d at 1348 (emphasis added). 
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if a family settlement agreement is not approved, it is not binding, A 
hypothetical based on the facts of Chasel makes the point. If William 
Chasel had found the new will prior to court approval, would there be 
any question he would have been entitled to repudiate the settlement 
agreement and present the newly discovered will of his father for 
probate? 
The Court of Appeals simply dismissed Chasel as "dictum" and 
interpreted sections 1101 and 1102 in a way that is totally at odds 
with Chasel. (A-l at 6-7). Under its interpretation, if William 
Chasel had found his father's new will before court approval, he would 
not have been entitled to repudiate the settlement agreement and 
present his father's will for probate. That is not what this Court 
directed in Chasel. 
Even if the Court of Appeals' division of enforceability of 
family settlement agreements between section 912 and sections 1101 and 
1102 made sense, it does not matter in this case. If the FSA was not 
subject to the approval provisions of sections 1101 and 1102, the FSA 
was invalid and void at its inception because it materially altered and 
terminated a spendthrift trust. 
The unchallenged rule is that beneficiaries of a trust may not 
materially alter or terminate a trust if such termination or altera-
tion would frustrate a material purpose of the trust. Sundguist v. 
Sundguist, 639 P.2d 181, 187 (Utah 1981); Restatement (Second) of 
Trusts § 337(2). This rule has been uniformly applied to preclude the 
material alteration or termination of a spendthrift trust. See 
Sundguist, 639 P.2d at 187; Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 337 
Comment o; 4 Scott on Trusts, § 337.2. The conseguence of this rule is 
that without court approval a family settlement agreement materially 
altering and terminating a spendthrift trust is invalid and unenforce-
able regardless of repudiation. Restatement (Second) of Trusts, 
§ 337, Comment o. 
The only provision of the Uniform Probate Code giving the court 
authority to approve a family settlement agreement materially altering 
or terminating a spendthrift trust is section 1101. Section 1101 
explicitly provides: "An approved compromise is binding even though 
it may affect a trust or an inalienable interest.H There is no simi-
lar provision in section 912 or, for that matter, any other section of 
the Uniform Probate Code. 
The Court of Appeals did not even pretend to come up with any 
rationale for its decision. Instead, it did nothing more than conclude: 
We have found the FSA to be a valid contract, even without 
court approval. However, the trial court in its judgment 
approved the FSA. Under § 75-3-1101, it is thus binding even 
though it may affect a trust or an inalienable interest. 
(A-l at 13). There is simply no logic that would support that conclu-
sion. The FSA was either subject to the court approval requirements 
of sections 1101 and 1102 and therefore not binding prior to court 
approval or it was not subject to the court approval provisions of 
sections 1101 and 1102 and therefore invalid and void from its 
inception because it materially altered and terminated a spendthrift 
trust. The Court of Appeals cannot have it both ways. 
Finally, the only purported support the Court of Appeals 
mustered up for its position that section 912 is controlling, a 1948 
Michigan opinion In re Peck's Estate, 34 N.W. 2d 533 (Mich. 1948), and 
an A.L.R. Annotation, plainly and simply are inapposite. 
The Michigan statute that was applicable to the In re Peck's 
Estate decision was clearly and materially different from the Uniform 
Probate Code. The Michigan statute did not have provisions comparable 
to sections 1101 and 1102 of the Uniform Probate Code. It only had 
one provision and that single provision explicitly limited the need 
for court approval to settlement agreements where there were minors, 
incapacitated persons or inalienable interests." Compare Mich. § 
27-5191 with Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3-912, 1101, 1102. 
The Court of Appeals' reliance on the Annotation, Family 
Settlement of Testator's Estate, 29 A.L.R.3d 8, 25, 125 (1970) is 
similarly flawed. The cases in that Annotation simply did not address 
statutory provisions, such as the Uniform Probate Code, that required 
court approval of family settlement agreements before they were 
binding. They did not address the issue of whether family settlement 
agreements may be repudiated prior to court approval. They did not 
deal with a family settlement agreement materially altering a spend-
thrift trust. 
B. The Court Of Appeals' Denial Of Petitioners' Right To Trial By 
Jury On The Issues Of Duress And Failure Of Consideration Is 
Contrary To This Court's Decision In International Harvester 
Credit Corp. And Violates Petitioners' Constitutional Right To 
Trial By Jury. 
The right to trial by jury is a right guaranteed by both the Utah 
and federal constitutions. Utah Const., Art. I, § 10; Beacon Theatres, 
Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); International Harvester Credit 
Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor & Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981). 
It is a right that is firmly embedded in this nation's legal system. 
International Harvester, 626 P.2d at 419-20, 
6. The Court of Appeals lightly brushes off the critical differences 
between the Michigan statute and the Uniform Probate Code stating: "We 
are persuaded that In re Peck is in point despite slightly different 
language in the statutes." (A-l at 8 n.6) (emphasis added). Saying 
that the differences are not material does not make it so. 
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This Court has adopted the federal rule for determining when 
the constitutional right to jury trial applies in civil cases. 
International Harvester, supra. The federal rule and the Utah rule 
are that if the same issues are raised both in equitable claims and 
legal counterclaims, the constitutional right to jury trial requires 
that issues arising in both the equitable and legal claims be tried to 
a jury first. International Harvester, supra.; Dairy Queen, Inc. v. 
Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1962); Beacon Theatres, supra. 
The Court of Appeals simply disregarded the rule adopted by 
this Court and held that Petitioners were not entitled to a jury trial 
on the issues of duress and failure of consideration because 
Respondents put on no evidence in support of their claim for damages 
in their counterclaim, and hence, such affirmative defenses became 
moot.M (A-l at 13). The Court of Appeals got it backwards. The 
right to a jury trial is determined by the claims and issues submitted 
for trial under the pleadings and pretrial order, not by what happens 
after trial commences. You do not lose the right to trial by jury 
after the trial begins. Once Respondents asserted the breach of 
contract counterclaim and proceeded to trial on that claim, 
Petitioners had a constitutional right to a jury trial on the issues 
7/ 
of duress and failure of consideration.— 
Certiorari in this case is necessary to resolve the scope of 
the constitutional right to jury trial in civil cases guaranteed by 
Art. I, Sec. 10 of the Utah Constitution. Under the rationale of the 
Court of Appeals' decision, it is as if this Court's decision in 
7. The issues of duress and failure of consideration can be tried 
with Petitioners' claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress which the Court of Appeals has remanded for a jury trial. 
(A-l, at 13-18). 
International Harvester never existed. The Court of Appeals' decision 
will generate substantial uncertainty concerning the Utah law on the 
constitutional right to jury trial in civil cases. Courts and 
practitioners need to know what the scope of that constitutional right 
is . 
The administration of a sound certiorari policy requires this 
Court to take certiorari when the Court of Appeals disregards the 
plain language of Utah statutes and decisions of this Court. Because 
of the backlog of cases, this Court is pouring over virtually all 
civil appeals to the Court of Appeals. The degree to which this Court 
must rely on the Court of Appeals is all the more reason the Court of 
Appeals needs to follow this Court's decisions and the legislative 
directive embodied in the language of State statutes. 
CONCLUSION 
This Petition presents important questions of state law which 
the Court of Appeals erroneously decided contrary to the Utah 
Constitution, the plain language of the Uniform Probate Code, opinions 
of this Court and unanimous authority from other jurisdictions. This 
Court should review that erroneous decision. Petitioners therefore 
respectfully request their Petition be granted. 
DATED: February VI 1990. 
BERMtfN St Of'ROR 
Pegg] 
Suite~L250 
50 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 328-2200 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
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